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Introduction
A large body of empirical research now documents strong short to medium-term persistence in stock returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that buying past winners and selling past losers can generate significant abnormal profits. A sizeable portion of these so-called momentum profits appears to be based on persistence in industry returns (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999 ).
The present paper adds to this line of work by documenting a new kind of return persistencepositive cross-correlation among industries that are related to each other through the supply chain -which we call cross-industry momentum to distinguish it from prior works on own-momentum (hereafter momentum) at either the stock or industry level. Based on inter-industry flow of goods and services from the Input-Output Benchmark Survey of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, we find that related industry returns (upstream and downstream) lead industry returns. We also find cross-industry momentum effects to be distinct from previously documented firm and industry level momentum effects.
In addition, we explore the economic significance of our results and find that trading strategies based on cross-industry effects produce economically significant profits. For example, a trading strategy that consists of buying (selling) industries with large positive (negative) returns to their upstream industries over the previous month yields an annual premium of more than 6 percent and a Sharpe ratio of 0.7.
To motivate our empirical analysis of cross-industry momentum, we propose a simple limited information model in which only a certain fraction of investors receive informative signals about risky asset payoffs. Since then investors hold heterogenous beliefs, information gets impounded into prices partially and gradually over time. 1 More relevant to the analysis of this paper, we show that cross-momentum arises naturally among risky assets with positively correlated fundamentals. 1 Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002) provide a similar rationale for momentum.
Using firm-level data from Compustat, we find supportive evidence that related industries as defined in our analysis indeed have positively correlated fundamentals. This result may appear surprising at first if one's prior is that related industries play what ultimately is a strategic zero-sum game and that what is good news for a supplying industry must be bad news for the buying industry.
While in reality such strategic interaction undoubtedly takes place among related industries, it would appear that an equally plausible alternative effect -the fortunes of related industries rising and falling together due to demand or technology shocks -dominates empirically.
In a number of robustness tests, we find that large stocks (market capitalization above the median NYSE cutoff) do not exhibit cross-industry momentum. That prices of large stocks are efficient with respect to stock prices in related industries is supportive of our limited information motivation for studying cross-industry momentum because both momentum and cross-momentum effects arise in the model when some investors are more informed than others. One would expect such differences in information among investors to be less prevalent for large firms than small firms.
For example, if information intermediaries focus most of their research efforts on large firms (Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) show that large stocks have better analyst coverage) and as a result even out informational differences among investors, then one would expect stock prices of large firms to be efficient with respect to developments in related industries.
It is important to note that our findings of cross-industry momentum are robust to the exclusion of stocks with market capitalization below the 20th NYSE percentile, and so the cross-industry effects that we document in this paper are distinct from findings of delayed price response among micro-cap stocks. (Also see Lo and MacKinlay (1990) , Brennan, Jegadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) , Mech (1993) , Hou (2002) , Hou and Moskowitz (2002) .) Furthermore, in contrast to delayed price response that appears to be a predominantly intra-industry effect with large firms leading small firms (Hou, 2002) , cross-industry momentum is an inter-industry effect.
Finally, we investigate whether there is any systematic difference between economically large and small supply chain relationships. To address this question, we allocate an industry's upstream and downstream industries to one of six portfolios (three upstream and three downstream) based on the amount of inter-industry flow of goods and services reported in the Input-Output Benchmark Survey and then explore the predictive power of these portfolio returns for industry returns. 2 For the most part, we find that cross-industry momentum is due to small and medium supply chain relationships. Related industry portfolios consisting of the largest supply chain relationships have no predictive power for industry returns, indicating that stock prices are efficient with respect to developments in upstream and downstream industries that matter the most economically. As for the model, there is still the question of why readily available past returns are not fully reflected in prices. One possibility is that some investors find it costly to gather that information. Or it could be that some investors are not fully aware of every supply chain relationship.
To our knowledge, the idea that limited information could generate persistent returns across fundamentally related risky assets is largely unexplored. Perhaps most related to the present paper is work by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) who document autocorrelation in industry returns and conjecture that this could be due to cross-correlation among stocks within the same industry, though they do not provide direct evidence of these conjectured cross links like we do here for transacting industries. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) focus on autocorrelation in stock returns and find that stocks with more analyst coverage exhibit shorter momentum which they interpret as 2 We construct three upstream portfolios such that they represent an equal amount of inter-industry trade. To be more concrete, the first upstream portfolio for an industry contains those upstream industries that supply it the least yet together provide one-third of its purchases in total whereas the third upstream portfolio contains upstream industries that supply it the most and also provide one third of its purchases (with the remaining upstream industries providing one-third of its supplies assigned to the second upstream portfolio). We form three downstream portfolios in the same way.
faster diffusion of dispersed information. Hong, Torous and Valkanov (2003) show that a number of industries lead the stock market by up to two months, which is a consistent aggregate implication of cross-industry momentum.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple limited information model to motivate our study of cross-industry momentum. Section 3 briefly describes the data sources and return series used throughout the paper. In Section 4, we discuss our empirical approach and present our basic findings about cross-industry persistence in returns. Section 5 explores trading strategies based on cross-industry momentum. We present some evidence of systematic difference between large and small supply chain relationships in Section 6 and provide concluding remarks in Section 7.
The Model
In this section, we outline a limited information model that emphasizes differences in information and consequently differences in beliefs among investors, which together with limited risk bearing capacity lead to momentum and cross-momentum in prices. To keep the analysis simple, we use the standard CARA-normal setup and study competitive Walrasian equilibria. 3 We provide formal proofs of our propositions in the Appendix.
We first show that prices do not exhibit momentum when investors have homogeneous beliefs.
That is, we show that prices do not exhibit momentum when every investor receives the same informative signal and as a result has the same posterior belief about future asset payoffs. This example serves as an useful benchmark to the case in which only a certain fraction of the population 3 Alternatively, one could use the noisy rational expectations equilibrium concept in which prices serve the dual role of clearing markets and updating beliefs. Since prices would still not be fully revealing as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1982) , informational differences would remain and investors would hold heterogeneous beliefs, which would then lead to momentum (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 2002 ) and cross-momentum in prices.
receives the informative signal. When investors differ in their information sets by having or not having the informative signal, differences in posterior beliefs arise naturally. Once investors have different posterior beliefs, we show that prices incorporate information partly and gradually, and that prices exhibit momentum. 4 Finally, we show that the above result about price momentum in one risky asset extends to price momentum across risky assets with positively correlated payoffs. Specifically, we show that equilibrium prices of two risky assets with positively correlated payoffs exhibit cross-momentum when a fraction of the population receives an informative signal about one of the assets with further implications for the other asset.
Momentum
Suppose that there are three dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, a single risky asset in positive supply z that pays a liquidating dividend d at t = 2, and a riskless asset whose gross payoff is normalized to 1 and hence is the numareire. There are n investors in the economy with constant absolute risk aversion parameter a. Investors trade the risky asset at t = 0 and t = 1, and then consume the liquidating dividend at t = 2. Their common prior belief at t = 0 is that Proposition 1 When every investor receives the informative signal s about d, equilibrium prices do not exhibit momentum.
4 Skill driven differences in information acquisition costs among investors could plausibly lead to such equilibriain which only investors with information processing skills above a certain threshold (or equivalently, acquisition costs below a certain threshold) choose to acquire informative signals.
However, when only a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the population receives the informative signal, equilibrium prices exhibit momentum because the informative signal gets incorporated less than fully at t = 1 due to informed investors' limited risk bearing capacity.
Proposition 2 When only a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the population receives the informative signal s about d, equilibrium prices exhibit momentum.
Cross-Momentum
Suppose now that there are two risky assets k ∈ {1, 2} both in positive supply z with correlated liquidating dividends d 1 and d 2 . The common prior belief at t = 0 is that
At t = 1, some investors receive an informative but noisy signal s 1 where
Proposition 3 When only a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the population receives the informative signal s 1 about d 1 and ρ > 0, equilibrium prices exhibit cross-momentum.
When only a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the population receives the informative signal about one of the assets with implications for the other asset (ρ > 0), equilibrium prices exhibit cross-momentum. Using the industry account-SIC code dictionary provided as part of the BEA Survey, we first assign firms to their respective industries based on their reported SIC codes in CRSP. 5 We then calculate value-weighted monthly industry returns. Finally, we transform the macroeconomic data from the BEA Survey into portfolio weights. Using these weights, we construct the return on the representative supplier (upstream portfolio) and customer (downstream portfolio) for each industry.
Data
Formally, our return series are calculated as follows:
where R i,t is the value-weighted return of industry i in month t, R j,t is the stock return of firm j (in industry i) in month t, M j,t−1 is the market capitalization of firm j at the end of month t − 1, 5 In a small number of instances where a SIC industry is assigned to more than one industry account, we keep the first entry in the dictionary and drop the remaing entries to prevent any chance of a hard-wired cross-industry momentum result based on own industry momentum (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999) . 6 The problem with the wholesale/retail industry account is that the BEA Survey lumps all wholesale and retail activity in the economy into one industry account. As a result, the industry account-SIC code dictionary, which we that related industries as defined in our analysis have positively correlated fundamentals as measured by return on assets.
We should mention one important caveat before proceeding with our analysis -the volume of inter-industry trade used in our construction of upstream and downstream returns comes from the 1987 BEA Survey. Obviously, we would like to avoid using data that only became available after the fact for some of the years in our predictive regressions and trading strategies. However, we are constrained by the fact that the BEA first published its survey in 1982. Since then, there have been just three more surveys (1987, 1992 and 1997) as these surveys are published once in every five years using comprehensive Census data. Moreover, out of the already limited four options that
we have, we cannot use the 1997 survey because the BEA switched the way it classified industries in 1997 from SIC to NAICS, which makes the link to CRSP problematic.
As a robustness check, we have run our programs using the 1982 and 1992 surveys. The results are essentially unchanged and so for brevity we report results using the 1987 survey only. We obtain almost identical results because the correlation among the surveys is relatively high. Specifically, the correlation of upstream portfolio weights, 
Panel Regressions
To explore cross-industry persistence in industry returns, we estimate variants of the following panel regression:
where R i,t , R us i,t and R ds i,t are contemporaneous own, upstream and downstream returns of industry i in month t, respectively. We include month fixed effects a t to absorb systematic market return in month t and compute standard errors that are robust to clustering (dependence of error terms) at the monthly level. 7 Naturally, we are interested in the predictive power of R i,t−1 , R us i,t−1 and R ds i,t−1 which are lagged own, upstream and downstream returns of industry i in month t − 1, respectively. Consistent with earlier findings of industry momentum, we find that high past industry returns predict high future industry returns as evidenced by a statistically significant positive coefficient on R i,t−1 (0.030). While the industry definitions used in this paper are somewhat different from those used in the literature, it is reassuring to see that the BEA Survey industry accounts exhibit similar return patterns that have been found to be significant in previous work.
Having established these basic results, we explore the predictive power of returns in upstream and downstream industries in column 3. As evidenced by statistically significant positive coefficients on R us i,t−1 (0.058) and R ds i,t−1 (0.038), we find strong cross-industry momentum from upstream and downstream industries. Compared to own industry momentum, cross-industry momentum from upstream industries appears to be more than twice as large, and almost 50 percent larger from downstream industries. Combined together, cross-industry momentum from both upstream and downstream industries presents a magnitude of predictability that is more than three times that of own industry momentum.
Finally in columns 4 and 5, we test whether these different sources of return predictability interact with each other in any meaningful way. It appears that cross-momentum from upstream and downstream industries and own industry momentum are pair-wise independent from each other as evidenced by statistically insignificant coefficients on interaction terms R us i,t−1 * R ds i,t−1 , R us i,t−1 * R i,t−1 and R ds i,t−1 * R i,t−1 at the one-percent level.
Fama-MacBeth Regressions
To further explore the statistical robustness and economic significance of our results so far about strong cross-industry momentum from upstream and downstream industries, we estimate FamaMacBeth type regressions in this subsection. Essentially, we run regressions of the following form for each month:
, and b β SMB i,t are return betas for industry i in month t (estimated using industry returns in months t − 60 through t − 1) to control for known patterns in stock returns.
Our specifications leave out contemporaneous upstream and downstream returns so that we can ultimately interpret our results as premiums that can be replicated with a tradeable portfolio strategy.
After estimating variants of specification (6) for each month, we calculate means and standard deviations of estimated coefficients (assuming independence of estimated coefficients across each monthly regression), and report our results in Table III . Column 3 shows that previous findings of own industry momentum are robust to controlling for systematic book-to-market and size effects as evidenced by a statistically significant positive coefficient on R i,t−1 (0.029).
We include our main predictive variables, namely lagged upstream and downstream returns, in column 4 and find that cross-industry momentum is also robust to controlling for systematic bookto-market and size effects as evidenced by statistically significant positive coefficients on R us i,t−1 (0.079) and R ds i,t−1 (0.050). Once again, the combined magnitude of cross-industry momentum from both upstream and downstream industries appears to surpass that of own industry momentumthe combined total is a quite remarkable annual premium of 12.9%.
In column 5, we further control for industry book-to-market and size directly, and find a similar combined premium of 12.5%. Also in unreported firm-level Fama-MacBeth regressions that control for firm-level short term reversal effects at the one-month horizon and medium term momentum effects at the one-year horizon, coefficients on both R us i,t−1 and R ds i,t−1 continue to remain statistically and economically significant.
Based on our findings of robust cross-industry momentum, we now turn our attention to trading strategies that exploit this apparent return predictability. In addition to assessing the profitability of these trading strategies, our goal is to explore and better pinpoint the source of cross-industry momentum profits.
Our trading strategies consist of ranking industries into five bins on a monthly basis (presumably at the beginning of a month) based on returns in their upstream or downstream industries in the previous month. After ranking industries in this fashion, we construct zero-cost equal-weighted and value-weighted (using industry market capitalization) portfolios that buy industries in the high bin and sell industries in the low bin. Table IV reports our results. In Panel A, trading strategies based on cross-industry momentum from upstream industries yield annual premiums of more than 6%. The premium on the equalweighted strategy is slightly higher than the premium on the value-weighted strategy (6.8% versus 6.5%) whereas the Sharpe ratio of the equal-weighted strategy is significantly better than that of the value-weighted strategy (0.852 versus 0.573). Figure 1 graphs potential cumulative trading profits beyond the first month.
Interestingly, trading strategies based on cross-industry momentum from downstream industries (reported in Panel B) yield annual premiums of 5.6% and 6.0% for equal-and value-weighted strategies, respectively -which are slightly higher than the estimates in our panel and FamaMacBeth regressions, though it is important to note that our typical trading strategy is built on a single sort and thus is not perfectly comparable to the multivariate regressions of Section 3.
Robustness Checks
We next perform a number of robustness checks. First, we look into whether there are any large differences in the market capitalization of industries in the long and short legs of our trading strategies and find nothing that may pose implementation problems (Panel C in Table IV ). The mean industry market capitalization in the long leg of the upstream strategy is $8,351 million, which is only slightly more than the mean industry market capitalization of $7,722 million in the short leg. Likewise, the difference between the long and short legs of the downstream strategy is negligible ($6,180 million versus $6,129).
Second, we look at whether only a small number of industries enter into our trading strategies and drive our results, and find that while there is some heterogeneity in inclusion probabilities (Table   V) , the amount is not excessive to pose implementation problems. For example, if industries were identical in their inclusion probabilities, they would enter our trading strategies roughly 1.5 percent of the time. It turns out that the maximum inclusion probability of an industry rarely exceeds 3 percent in any of the leg-strategy combinations and, when it does, the industry in question also appears in the opposite leg of the strategy with a high probability. This last fact is especially important because it shows that the profitability of our trading strategies is not simply driven by going long (short) in industries with historically high (low) returns.
Third, we regress monthly returns from our trading strategies on widely recognized return factors such the Fama-French HML and SMB, and Carhart MOM, and find that cross-industry momentum returns are essentially orthogonal to them (Table VI) . The intercept is 0.5% for both upstream and downstream strategies -which translates into an annualized Jensen's alpha of 6%
in line with our previous results. We also try to alleviate a potential concern that our trading strategies might be timing the return factors -increase and decrease exposure during positive and negative realizations, respectively. In even-numbered specifications in Table VI, we include interaction terms with a business-cycle indicator variable using NBER recession dates and find no sign of factor timing.
Fourth, we return to the multivariate panel regression approach of Section 3 to alleviate a concern that our single-sort cross-industry momentum trading strategies might be benefiting from own-industry momentum. In Table VII , we estimate variants of the following panel regression:
where the indicator variables proxy for our trading strategies by taking on a value of one for observations that fall into either a high bin (above the 80 th percentile) or a low bin (below the 20 th percentile) for the corresponding return variable (previous month own, upstream or downstream industry return). 8 Columns 1 through 3 include each trading strategy separately and thus represent the profitability of single-sort strategies. Compared to the profitability of own industry-momentum of about 6.5% annually (19 basis points on the long leg and 35 basis points on the short leg multiplied by 12), upstream and downstream cross-momentum strategies yield 6.8% (29 basis points on the long leg and 28 basis points on the short leg multiplied by 12) and 5.6% (17 basis points on the long leg and 30 basis points on the short leg multiplied by 12), respectively. 9 In column 4, we include all three trading strategies simultaneously and find essentially the same results -it appears that the returns from the three trading strategies are fairly orthogonal to each other. In column 5, we exclude the month of January and find similar results. In columns 6 and 7, we split the sample into two halves, 1963-1982 and 1983-2002 , and find that while profitability has remained robust, its composition has changed somewhat over time. Most notably, it appears that the profitability of the upstream cross-momentum strategy has switched from the short leg in the first half of the sample to the long leg in the second half, indicating a potentially easier source of profits. In column 8, we explore the joint profitability of the upstream and downstream cross-momentum strategies and find an annual premium of roughly 9.3% (35 basis points on the long leg and 43 basis points on the short leg multiplied by 12).
Finally, we plot the historical profitability of upstream and downstream strategies in Figure 2 .
Except at the very end of the sample period, profits appear to be remarkably consistent over time.
In Figure 3 , we provide some historical comparison with Fama-French HML and SMB, and Carhart MOM returns.
Large versus Small Stocks
Our trading strategies produce insignificant results when we restrict attention to the universe of large stocks (market capitalization above the median NYSE cutoff). Table VIII reports these results. Both upstream and downstream strategies yield essentially no profits.
The absence of cross-industry momentum among large stocks may suggest that our findings are purely driven by small stocks. Table IX shows that is not the case. When we restrict attention to firms with market capitalizations above the 20 th percentile NYSE cutoff, we obtain significant results for both upstream and downstream strategies in the order of 5% and 6% as before. And so, cross-industry momentum is not driven by micro stocks.
We can think of four reasons that may explain these results. First, it could be that a single SIC code from CRSP does not do a good job of describing a large firm's overall business. That is, we may not have as precise a set of related upstream and downstream industries for large firms as we do have for small firms and the insignificant results with large stocks may be due to this measurement error. Second, it could be that prices of large stocks incorporate most information from related industries, no matter how dispersed -say because large stocks are actively followed by information intermediaries who specialize in collecting and analyzing such dispersed information.
We know from prior research that large stocks have better analyst coverage. Third, it could be that we reduce the information content of upstream and downstream returns when we restrict attention to large stocks -especially if it is information particularly in the prices of small stocks that diffuses gradually to both large and small stocks over time. Fourth, it could be that most large firms are integrated into upstream and downstream industries and that they do not have clear firm boundaries that we can identify with a single SIC code from CRSP.
These are all interesting possibilities and ultimately relate to alternative economic mechanisms that could be behind cross-industry momentum. The investigation of these interesting possibilities requires non-CRSP data sources such as IBES to explore the role of analyst coverage and Compustat segment files to obtain detailed data about business composition. In related current work, we are exploiting these databases to better understand cross-industry momentum.
Large versus Small Supply Chain Relationships
In this section, we investigate whether there is any systematic difference between economically large and small supply chain relationships. To address this question, we allocate an industry's upstream and downstream industries to one of six portfolios (three upstream and three downstream) based on the amount of inter-industry flow of goods and services reported in the Input-Output Benchmark Survey and then explore the predictive power of these portfolio returns for industry returns.
We construct the three upstream portfolios so that they contain an equal amount of interindustry trade. Specifically, we first sort upstream industries according to their sales to the reference industry in ascending order and then allocate them to one of three portfolios: 0-33%, 33-66% and 66-100%. The 0-33% portfolio is comprised of a set of upstream industries whose sales are the smallest and add up to 33% of the total purchases of the reference industry. The 33-66% portfolio is comprised of the next set of upstream industries whose sales constitute another 33% of the total. The 66-100% portfolio is comprised of the remaining upstream industries. We form three downstream portfolios in the same way and estimate regressions of the form: do not appear to be behind our findings of cross-industry momentum. Some descriptive statistics might help to give a sense of the typical upstream relationships covered by the three portfolios. The mean upstream supply ratio,
, is 1%, 11% and 18% in the 0-33%, 33-66% and 66-100% portfolios, respectively.
We next consider downstream relationships in column 2 and find that the entire downstream cross-industry momentum comes from the smallest relationships as evidenced by a statistically significant coefficient on R
(0.049) -neither the 33-66% nor the 66-100% portfolio appears to be behind our findings of cross-industry momentum. Once again, some descriptive statistics might help. The mean downstream purchase ratio,
, is 1%, 12% and 16% in the 0-33%, 33-66% and 66-100% portfolios, respectively. We consider upstream and downstream portfolios simultaneously in column 3, and obtain similar results.
Conclusion
This paper documents strong cross-industry persistence in returns. Based on data about the flow of goods and services between industries from the BEA Survey, we show that industry returns lag returns in related industries (upstream and downstream). Trading strategies that consist of buying (selling) industries with large positive (negative) returns to their upstream or downstream industries over the previous month yield significant profits.
We interpret these findings as suggestive of partial and gradual diffusion of information across fundamentally related risky assets. In ongoing work, we are investigating a similar phenomena in the formation of analyst earnings expectations.
A potentially interesting extension could be to investigate whether the stock markets of related economies exhibit cross-momentum. Analogous to the flow of goods and services in the InputOutput Benchmark Survey, one could use import and export data to measure economic linkages between countries.
More work lies ahead before we know whether cross-industry momentum is a widespread return pattern in other stock markets. Fortunately, the Input-Output Benchmark Survey of the Bureau of Economic Analysis is a fairly common type of analytical exercise carried out in most OECD countries. In addition to exploring cross-industry momentum internationally, a cross-country study can also shed some light on how financial sophistication (as measured by the speed with which fundamental information from related industries is processed and priced) is related to the level of financial development or the structure of the financial system.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Investor demand for the risky asset at t = 0 is
Market clearing requires
Substituting in investor demand yields
After investors receive the informative signal s, their demand for the risky asset at t = 1 becomes
where
Posterior beliefs about the liquidating dividend come from a normal projection of s on d
where the residual uncertainty about the liquidating dividend η s is distributed N ³ 0, σ 2 d|s´. By the optimality of the projection
Market clearing at t = 1 requires
Without loss of generality, define returns
and see that equilibrium prices do not exhibit momentum because the informative signal is incorporated fully at t = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. The equilibrium price at t = 0 is the same as in Proposition 1 and so
At t = 1, α (n i /n) fraction of the population receives the informative signal s and their demand for the risky asset at t = 1 becomes
For (1 − α) (n u /n) fraction of the population, demand for the risky asset at t = 1 is
Substituting in investor demands X I 1 and X U 1 yields
Because the informative signal is not incorporated fully at t = 1, equilibrium prices exhibit momentum.
Proof of Proposition 3. Investor demand for the two risky asset at t = 0 is
Market clearing at t = 0 requires nX 0 = z1.
Substituting investor demand yields
After a fraction α of the population receives the informative signal s 1 , their demand at t = 1
Posterior beliefs about the liquidating dividend come from a normal projection of s 1 on d 1 and d 2 .
where the residual uncertainty about the liquidating dividends is distributed N (0, Σ s 1 ) . By projection optimality
For (1 − α) fraction of the population, demand for the risky asset at t = 1 is
Because the informative signal is not incorporated fully at t = 1, equilibrium prices exhibit crossmomentum. 
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This table presents profitability of several cross-industry momentum strategies. Panel A (Panel B) reports mean and standard deviation of one-month industry returns ranked into five bins based on previous month upstream (downstream) portfolio returns. Both equal-weighted and value-weighted one-month industry returns are reported. Panel C reports mean and standard deviation of industry market capitalization in each bin. 
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